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Abstract
Th ere is a vast literature on evidence-based practice (EBP) in education. What function does evidence have 
in practical deliberations toward decisions about what to do? Most writers on EBP seem to think of evidence 
largely as quantitative data, serving as a foundation from which practice could and should be directly derived. 
In this paper I argue that we are better served by according a diff erent and more indirect function to evidence 
in practical reasoning. To establish this claim I employ Toulmin’s model of argumentation. On this model the 
evidence-as-foundation view amounts to evidence as data/grounds. Th e model also off ers a diff erent function 
for evidence, as backing of the warrant, and I argue in this paper that this is a more adequate understanding 
of the function of evidence in practical reasoning.
Keywords
Backing, EBP, evidence, grounds, reasoning, Toulmin model, warrant.
Tema: Erkendelse, viden og læring
Introduction
Th ere exists a vast and growing literature on evidence-based practice (hereafter EBP) in 
education; hardly surprising given the status of “evidence-based” as a buzzword in contem-
porary educational debates (and also in e.g. medicine, military leadership and policy-mak-
ing). In education EBP largely seems to have arisen as a government wish for better research 
bases to inform policy and practice; this has become known as the what works agenda. 
It is not easy to characterize neither EBP nor the debate about it. Th ere are diff erent def-
initions, diff erent perspectives, diff erent opinions and some general unclarity, confusions 
and misunderstandings. Th e current educational “landscape” is dominated by a vocabulary 
consisting of concepts and ideas such as learning outcomes, testing, measurement, quali-
fi cation, employability, accountability, eff ectiveness, competencies and predictability; here 
given in no particular order. Since schooling and education are considered successful when 
predetermined outcomes have been achieved, education makes excessive requirements of 
assessment, measurement and documentation. EBP is generally seen as belonging in this 
picture; to know what works in order to maximize the probability of attaining the goal. 
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Th e critics claim that all these concepts taken together make for a very narrow and highly 
instrumental conception of education.
Th is criticism of the big picture of contemporary education is, to my mind, both perti-
nent and justifi ed. But it cannot automatically be assumed that it thereby applies to EBP as 
well; EBP in itself is neither necessary nor suffi  cient to produce the educational landscape 
outlined above. Whatever else one might disagree about concerning EBP, there is wide-
spread agreement about at least one part of its “core”: EBP concerns use of the best avail-
able evidence to produce good results for both client and society. “Client” is here a generic 
term that covers patients, students and any other clients professional practitioners might 
have. Th ere is, of course, much debate about what constitutes the “best available evidence” 
and about how “good results” should be interpreted and judged. In this paper I shall inquire 
into one delimited issue in this large complex, namely the question of how research evi-
dence can enter into teachers’ deliberations about what to do in their classrooms. Th at is, I 
shall inquire into the possible functions that evidence might perform in teachers’ reasoning 
toward a decision about what to do. As we shall see, evidence is largely assumed to play the 
role of a foundation for practice. I shall argue that evidence is better thought of as perform-
ing a diff erent, more indirect function, and to identify this function I propose to employ 
Stephen Toulmin’s model of argumentation.1 Th e role I shall propose deviates substantially 
from the role ascribed to evidence by most writers. I by no means wish to intimate that 
the role I shall advocate is the only role evidence can play; it is a role that emerges when we 
employ this particular analytical tool. First I shall look briefl y into certain aspects of the EBP 
debate relevant to my issue; then I use Toulmin’s model of argumentation to tease out the 
problems with the “foundation” view and to argue for what I take to be a more adequate 
role for evidence.
A brief sketch of the educational EBP debate
the overall framework for this paper is practical reasoning. Reasoning, Robert Audi2 says, is 
a common response to problems we care about. Practical reasoning comes in many shapes 
and forms, but it is generally agreed that it concerns what one should do, not what one 
should believe. Practical reasoning comprises a large domain in its own right, but I am only 
going to establish it here as an overall frame for my discussion. I am going to use Toulmin’s 
model as a model of reasoning, because I am interested in fi nding an adequate role for 
evidence in practical reasoning and to the best of my knowledge the general literature on 
practical reasoning will not help me do that. But it is important to make clear at the outset 
that what I am after here is teachers’ practical reasoning toward a decision about what to 
do. 
1 Stephen E. Toulmin, Th e Uses of Argument. Updated Edition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003). First 
published 1958.
2 Robert Audi, Practical Reasoning (London: Routledge, 1991).
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While practical reasoning is the framework for my discussion, the content is EBP and 
the possible functions of evidence. Much of the EBP debate in education has a rather 
adversarial character. Th ere are adherents and there are critics, and (at least until recently) 
the critics seem to far outnumber the adherents. It is generally agreed, though, that EBP 
from the beginning has had strong political overtones in the form of government wishes 
to improve the results of the educational system. Th is is of course a legitimate government 
concern. By extension, it is equally legitimate for governments to be concerned with how 
the desired results are best achieved; that is, to ask for knowledge of what works. To know if 
your strategy works you must be able to measure its outcomes, and there can be no doubt 
that measurement in schools have taken on quite unprecedented proportions in recent 
years. Critics argue that this is misguided because it narrows education to training and 
instruction and fails to do justice to broader cognitive processes that are not easily meas-
ured, such as e.g. rational refl ection and appreciation of art. I think the critics have a very 
good point here; all educationists have good reason to worry about the thorough-going 
instrumentalization of even higher education that we see today. But these particular wor-
ries mainly concern the objectives of education and our understanding of what education 
is all about, and in this paper I am going to be concerned with the possible functions of 
research evidence in the practical deliberations of teachers and other practitioners. I should 
like to make it clear that my reasoning examples are fi ctive. Th ey are thus only illustrations 
of how such reasoning can proceed, not empirical examples of how practical reasoning 
actually happens.
Th e kick-off  for the debate was David Hargreaves’ now (in)famous TTA lecture in 1996.3 
Th rough a comparison with medicine he argues that teaching is not a research-based pro-
fession; that a radical change in the kind of research done is needed, and that the organi-
zation of research must be changed accordingly. Educational research, Hargreaves insists, 
should serve to improve practice. Th is requires research which,
[...] (i) demonstrates conclusively that if teachers change their practice from x to y there will 
be a signifi cant and enduring improvement in teaching and learning and (ii) has developed 
an eff ective method of convincing teachers of the benefi ts of, and means to, changing from 
x to y.4
Th is will naturally, he thinks, lead to a dramatic increase in evidence-based research, and 
most of this will be quantitative evidence gathered using randomized controlled trials 
(RCT). 
Hargreaves is one of very few educational researchers I have come across who is enthu-
siastically in favor of EBP, although he is not completely alone. It is a constant theme for 
3 David Hargreaves, “Teaching as a research-based profession: Possibilities and prospects” (London: Teacher Training 
Agency Annual Lecture, 1996). 
4 Hargreaves, “Teaching as a research-based profession,” 5. 
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him that educational research should improve the performativity of teachers with respect 
to outcomes; outcomes generally perceived as measurable outputs. For this reason, he is 
a strong advocate of research into practical issues. To gather evidence about what works 
in what circumstances is the whole point of evidence-based research, he maintains.5 Th is 
kind of research is useful for policy-makers, school developers, headmasters and teachers 
and could thus have a direct impact on practice. Teachers, Hargreaves states, want to know 
what works – only secondarily are they interested in understanding the why of classroom 
events. 
Virtually every aspect of Hargreaves’ views has been attacked. He has become, I think, 
as so closely associated with EBP that criticism of his views is seen as tantamount to criti-
cism of EBP. His comparison of education to medicine is found wanting6 and his description 
of how research is funded is problematized.7 More substantially, his views about the nature 
and mission of educational research are criticized by many as being too narrow and instru-
mental but also too optimistic regarding what research can provide.8 Most importantly 
for my purposes in this paper, his (implied) views about the teaching profession are also 
criticized, generally by the same people who criticize his views on educational research. It is 
in the context of the profession that we fi nd the issue which I am going to concentrate on, 
namely professional judgment; most notably the part of it that consists of practical delib-
erations. As we shall see, some of the EBP critics worry that EBP means a more or less com-
plete displacement of professional judgment and argue that we for that reason (plus other 
additional reasons) should reject EBP altogether. And just for the record, it is of course 
possible to voice criticism of EBP without referring to David Hargreaves. For example, Bron-
wyn Davies9 largely sees EBP as being part of a managerial agenda to remove power from 
practitioners to bureaucrats. 
We can see from this brief sketch that in education the EBP debate branches off  in sev-
eral diff erent directions. It is not obvious that all writers share the same defi nition of EBP, 
and it may well be that EBP gets an unfair proportion of criticism simply by being part of 
what I above called the current educational landscape. In the next section I shall expand on 
a small selection of these criticisms; thus leaving many interesting issues untouched. I shall 
5 David Hargreaves, “Educational research and evidence-based educational practice – a response to critics,” Research 
Intelligence 58 (November 1996), 12-16. 
6 See for example Martyn Hammersley, “Educational research and teaching: A response to David Hargreaves’ TTA 
lecture,” British Educational Research Journal 23, no. 2 (1997): 141-161; Nigel Norris, “Professor Hargreaves, the TTA 
lecture and evidence-based practice,” Research Intelligence 57 (July 1996), 2-4
7 For example, John Gray, “Track record of peer review: A reply to some remarks by David Hargreaves,” Research 
Intelligence 57 (July 1996), 5-6
8 For example Gert Biesta, “Why ‘what works’ won’t work: Evidence-based practice and the democratic defi cit in 
educational research,” Educational Th eory 57, no. 1 (2007): 1-22; John Elliott, “Making evidence-based practice edu-
cational,” British Educational Research Journal 27, no. 5 (2001): 555-574 .
9 Bronwyn Davies, “Death to critique and dissent? Th e policies and practices of New Managerialism and of ‘evidence-
based practice’,” Gender and Education 15, no.1 (2003): 91-103.
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argue that there are misunderstandings and confusions here which can be unraveled if we 
use Toulmin’s model of argumentation. 
A Toulminian analysis of the function of evidence
Hargreaves paints in broad strokes and does not really discuss the question of how research 
evidence is to be used in practice or in practitioners’ deliberations over what to do in their 
practice. In fact, this question seems to be largely missing from the debate – there are hints 
and suggestions, but to the best of my knowledge no in-depth inquiries. In his TTA lecture 
Hargreaves approvingly describes evidence-based medicine (EBM) as often having a direct 
relevance to improvement of practice, and laments the view which says that research only 
has an indirect infl uence on policy and practice. He does not entirely agree with himself, 
though; other times he says that evidence should inform practice. However that may be, 
research should provide evidence of what works in what circumstances. By what works is 
meant the achievement of intended eff ects and/or the solving of problems.10 
I shall look into some related but separable issues concerning the uses of evidence in 
practical deliberations. Before I embark upon my analysis I shall present the essentials of 
Toulmin’s argument model, adding more details as they become necessary in the course 
of my discussion. Th e model is complex and sophisticated. Toulmin begins by distinguish-
ing between the claim or conclusion (C) that we are seeking to establish and the facts we 
appeal to as a foundation for C, called grounds or data (D).11 Th e question “How did you 
get there” draws attention to the step from D to C and how this step can be justifi ed or 
bridged. Propositions that provide the justifi cation for inferring C from D he terms war-
rants (W).12 Th e warrant seems to me to be of great importance, yet sadly neglected in 
educational reasoning. It authorizes the sort of step we make, licenses the inference, as 
David Hitchcock13 puts it. Toulmin himself raises the question of the distinction between 
data and warrants, since the same sentence may in some contexts convey information 
and in other contexts authorize an inferential step. In any case, he says, the task of the 
warrant is to “register explicitly the legitimacy of the step involved”.14 Warrants confer dif-
ferent degrees of strength on the claims that they justify; hence, we may need to use a 
qualifi er (Q) to express this, e.g. necessarily, presumably, possibly. Rebuttals (R), linguistically 
expressed as e.g. “unless”, refer to exceptional circumstances which undermine the general 
authority of the warrant. Both Q and R have a bearing on W; they comment on it, as Toul-
10 Ian Sanderson, “Is it ‘what works’ that matters? Evaluation and evidence-based policy-making,” Research Papers in 
Education 18, no. 4 (2003): 331-345.
11 Toulmin, Th e Uses of Argument, 90.
12 Ibid., 91.
13 David Hitchcock, “Toulmin’s warrants,” in Anyone who has a view. Th eoretical contributions to the study of argu-
mentation, ed. Frans van Eemeren, J. Anthony Blair, Charles Willard, and Franziska Snook Henkemans (Dordrecht: 
Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2003), 69-82.
14 Toulmin, 92.
24 Studier i Pædagogisk Filosofi  | Årgang 2 | Nr. 2 | 2013
min calls it. Next, we come to the question which is going to be central to my concerns; 
namely whether the warrant is acceptable at all. Suppose you insist that some C follows 
from data D, and somebody asks ‘but why do you think that?’ Th is is where the backing (B) 
of the warrant comes in: “Standing behind our warrants, […], there will normally be other 
assurances, without which the warrants themselves would possess neither authority nor 
currency”, Toulmin says.15 Following the lead of Milos Jenicek and David Hitchcock16 I shall 
argue that the concept of backing has the potential to clear up some of the fundamental 
misunderstandings about the functions of evidence in EBP. 
“Based”: evidence as data or grounds
First a brief note on evidence. Th e questions of who, why and what constitutes evidence are 
much discussed by both critics and advocates of EBP. Th e more basic questions of what 
evidence is and what the nature of the relationship between evidence and the claim is, are 
usually not addressed (but see Kvernbekk17 for a discussion). Th e established philosophical 
understanding sees evidence as something that supports a claim (belief, theory) or speaks 
to its truth value.18 In the educational EBP context, evidence is thought to speak to the 
eff ectiveness of a strategy or a method of teaching. 
But how, precisely, is evidence to be used by practitioners? I shall begin by looking into 
the question of what it might mean for practice to be based on evidence. It is not obvious 
that “based” is captured by the standard meaning of evidence, summed up in the term 
support. In the EBP debate, a literal understanding of it seems to be taken for granted. 
Bronwyn Davies19 is a case in point. She thinks of “based” in terms of a base or foundation 
consisting of facts and/or (quantitative) data. I think she voices what a good many writers 
on EBP, critics and adherents alike, take “based” to mean but do not say explicitly: a founda-
tion of data that are supposed to tell you what to do in practice. Davies herself is primarily 
interested in issues of power, and so focuses on the who question: who selects the evidence, 
who decides what is relevant, who defi nes what is eff ective and what counts as a success. 
I think we can identify a general tendency to understand the evidence–practice rela-
tionship as one of derivation: practice could and should be derived from a foundation of 
evidence. Th e idea is that if you derive a practice, it should be pretty clear what you ought 
to do.
Teachers, like other practitioners, have to make many decisions about course of action. 
I have poor readers in my class – what should I do? My students lack motivation to learn 
history – what should I do? And how do I reach a decision about what to do? I grant that 
15 Ibid., 96.
16 Milos Jenicek and David Hitchcock, Evidence-based practice. Logic and critical thinking in medicine (American 
Medical Association Press, 2005).
17 Tone Kvernbekk, “Th e concept of evidence in evidence-based practice,” Educational Th eory 61, no. 5 (2011), 515-
532.
18 See for example Peter Achinstein, Th e book of evidence (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001).
19 Davies, “Death to critique and dissent.”
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the examples might be simplistic, but the chains of reasoning that lead up to the decisions 
surely are not. I think that most participants in the debate, both critics and advocates of 
EBP alike, conceive of the relation between evidence and practice as parallel to the relation 
between data and claim. Suppose a teacher who is concerned with the reading skills of his 
students makes any of the following claims: “I shall try Bowyer-Crane’s method for improv-
ing phonological measures” or “I shall ask my colleague what she did” or “I shall give them 
the same exercises that worked so well last year”. Even an (overly) simple example like this 
can trigger considerations that seem to be largely missing from the debate. First, C may not 
be immediately obvious, and we may want to ask the teacher where it comes from; that 
is, what the basis for the claim is. Th e teacher may then say that he has poor readers in his 
class, a statement that serves as data D. I think that much reasoning about what one should 
do in practice is set off  by perceptions or felt problems such as this. But we do meet here 
with certain problems. First, at the outset more than one C may be inferred from the same 
data. Second, it is not obvious that this is the kind of data that would even pass for evi-
dence in EBP – it is certainly not what Hargreaves has in mind. Th ird, the implied relation 
here is tricky ground. Many philosophers think that the relation of a claim to its putative 
evidence is one of support, not foundation.20 Denis Phillips states explicitly that facts (evi-
dence) cannot be regarded as a base from which theory, policy or practice can be inferred. 
Yet he concedes that we in some sense might say that data generate hypotheses, but only 
in an indirect way as a source of puzzlement. Whatever the (somewhat uneasy) relation-
ship between foundation and support, the following is important to note: In some sense or 
other, data D comprise evidence of sorts, and they do provide the basis for C, in the sense 
that C is at least generated from it if not downright derived from it. 
Th ere are no detailed discussions in the educational EBP literature of what function one 
thinks that research evidence should have for practice. Quite naturally the term evidence-
based practice makes people think of evidence as something on which practice should be 
based. Th at is to say, evidence performs the function of data or grounds (D) from which 
practice should be derived. Adherents presumably think this is a good idea, critics think it 
is a bad idea. Let us look at the critics fi rst.
In a response to Hargreaves’ TTA lecture Martyn Hammersley throws doubt on the 
idea that teaching can be based on research knowledge. Th ere are two main reasons for 
this. Th e fi rst is that he thinks that the kinds of problems teachers mostly face are not 
open to research, since only “technical” problems are thus open. Th e second reason is that 
since teaching is practical rather than technical, “[…] it is a matter of making judgements 
rather than following rules”.21 In a similar vein, Gert Biesta describes the adherents to EBP 
(at least the most extreme of them) as “[…] those who think that research will be able 
20 For example Achinstein, Th e book of evidence; D. C. Phillips, “Adding complexity: Philosophical perspectives on 
the relationship between evidence and policy,” in Evidence and decision making. 106th NSSE yearbook, ed. Pamela 
Moss (Oxford: Blackwell, 2007), 376-402.
21 Hammersley, “Educational research and teaching,” 147, my emphasis.
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to give us ‘the truth’, that ‘the truth’ can be translated into rules for action, and that the 
only thing practitioners need to do is to follow these rules without any further refl ection 
on or consideration of the concrete situation they are in”.22 Th is is telling, I think. It is not 
clear where the idea comes from that EBP amounts to unrefl ective rule-following, but their 
views clearly indicate that the “evidence” in question serves as the grounds from which you 
derive your practice. It aggravates things if the evidence emanates from RCTs, since such 
evidence is general and thus forces the teacher to treat every student alike. Both Hammer-
sley and Biesta conclude that EBP, as they understand it, must be rejected. Obviously, both 
acknowledge that education has aims and need the means to achieve those aims, and that 
context-sensitive research can inform practice. 
Interestingly, David Hargreaves seems to ascribe much the same function to evidence: 
data (D) from which practice (C) is derived. Th is evidence should tell us what works in what 
circumstances. He does not elaborate on how exactly evidence is to do its job for practice, 
but argues several places that the impact should be direct. His critics, e.g. Hammersley, take 
him to mean that research should tell practitioners which is the best technique for deal-
ing with a particular kind of problem. Th at is, evidence provides the data from which you 
derive your practice. Th is is no mindless rule-following, though, he many times underscores 
that evidence should enhance professional judgment, not replace it. Nevertheless, it may 
be that Bridges, Smeyers and Smith have Hargreaves among others in mind when they 
describe EBP (the P standing in this case for ‘policy’) as follows:
Th e evidence-based policy movement seems almost to presuppose an algorithm which will 
generate policy decisions: If A is what you want to achieve and if research shows R1, R2 and 
R3 to be the case, and if furthermore research shows that doing P is positively correlated 
with A, then it follows that P is what you need to do. So provided you have your educational/
political goals sorted out, all you need to do is slot in the appropriate research fi ndings – the 
right information – to extract your policy.23 
Here we fi nd a complication, namely the explicit introduction of goals. Some observations 
are in order. First, we see here that this type of consideration also casts evidence in the role 
of D – you extract your policy from it. Second, bringing a normative entity into the picture 
does not seem to make diffi  culties for the employment of Toulmin’s model. Th e goal could 
be included in the grounds from which you infer your conclusion as to what you should do. 
Th ird, many perceived educational problems seem to depend on goals, such that if there 
is no goal stating that students should learn x, the problems of what the teacher should 
do in relation to it would simply not occur and we would perhaps have no research into 
that type of problems either. Conversely, one may imagine a situation in which this order 
22 Biesta, “Why ‘what works’ won’t work,” 11.
23 David Bridges, Paul Smeyers and Richard Smith, “Educational research and the practical judgement of policy 
makers,” Journal of Philosophy of Education 41, Supplementary Issue 1 (2008), 5-11.
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of things is turned upside down, such that if existing evidence suggests that x is possible 
to achieve but z is not, then x becomes the goal – the desired results become identical to 
outcomes that are actually both attainable and measurable. Regretfully I have to leave this 
issue untreated in this paper.
 
Evidence as backing 
It is not diffi  cult to agree with the EBP critics that RCT evidence cannot be translated into 
rules for action and unrefl ectively implemented in practice. Th e literal understanding of 
“based” that takes evidence to have the function of data/grounds D in the Toulmin model 
clearly does not work – especially if the evidence in question is of the RCT kind. 
Before I inquire into a diff erent role for evidence, let me bring up again the example of 
the poor readers. What can we do when faced with a proposed claim and proposed data? 
To begin with, we might look closely at the descriptions of both C and D. As Jenicek and 
Hitchcock24 point out; there is no gold standard for the correctness (or eff ectiveness) of C. 
C should therefore be justifi ed by the best obtainable evidence; parts of which consists of 
D, but, as we shall see, not all. We also have to look at the description of D, and in our hypo-
thetical case we might fi nd it to be too vague. Just how poor readers are these students? 
Poor in what way? With some suitable description of D we are in a position to look at pos-
sible warrants. Th at is, we could ask our teacher how he got from D to C. In our hypotheti-
cal example it might look something like this: My students read poorly (D), so I shall ask 
my colleague what she did (C) since she is an experienced teacher (W). Alternatively: D, so 
I shall give them the same exercises that worked so well last year (C) since these students 
have the same problems, the same strategy should work (W). Alternatively: D, so I shall use 
Bowyer-Crane’s method to improve the phonological measures (C) since these particular 
reading problems are helped with better phonological measures (W). 
Th e warrant is the justifi cation for inferring C from D. It seems to me that the concept 
of a warrant is of great importance in educational reasoning, to draw attention to the rela-
tion between teachers’ decisions of what to do and the grounds their decisions are based 
on and to make this relation explicit. Often the warrant is left unstated, but in situations 
where people are asked to justify their actions or decisions the warrant is a good place 
to start. But what is a warrant? Toulmin requires that warrants be general, certifying the 
soundness of all arguments of the appropriate type. Warrants are not data; they are rules 
that basically say “data such as D entitle one to draw conclusions, or make claims, such as 
C”.25 David Hitchcock26 describes warrants as inference-licenses; that is, general rules which 
we reason in accordance with to authorize the step from D to C. Importantly, he points out 
that the question of how you get from D to C can have a variety of answers. In my example 
24 Jenicek and Hitchcock, Evidence-based practice, 41.
25 Toulmin, Th e Uses of Argument, 91.
26 Hitchcock, “Toulmin’s warrants.” 
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the warrants naturally vary because they license the inference to diff erent Cs, but one can 
easily imagine that the warrant from the same D to the same C can diff er. 
A warrant is thus not evidence in itself and must be established in a diff erent way than 
the facts we invoke as data.27 Obviously, not just any proposed warrant should be accepted 
as having authority; we might reasonably question the legitimacy of warrants if they strike 
us as somehow not up to standard. For example, we may ask why one should think that 
the same strategy will work with diff erent students, or why certain phonological skills can 
remedy a reading problem. Warrants above all need to be reliable, and thus it is that Toul-
min introduces the concept of backing; as that which justifi es our warrants and provides 
them with the authority they need to license the step from D to C. 
It is as backing that I think we can fi nd a good place for research evidence in EBP, even 
RCT evidence. Th is is a diff erent function for evidence; one that does not allow you derive 
decisions about what to do directly from the evidence, but one that helps you justify your 
decision. As a bonus, it provides a sensible answer to the much-discussed question of what 
it means for research evidence to inform practice. It suggests a more indirect role for evi-
dence, which seems to be what many EBP writers want but clearly fi nd hard to conceptual-
ize. 
Let us look at an example of reasoning to get to a conclusion about what to do. Again 
the example is fi ctive, and those well versed in research on reading will see immediately 
that I am taking certain liberties with the research. I use it simply to illustrate practical rea-
soning, nothing more. Suppose you are teaching fi rst-graders to read, and toward the end 
of the year you observe that some of them are reading-delayed. Th is observation is your 
data, D. So, you infer, these children should receive extra word and text training, C. When 
a colleague asks how you came to this decision, you may answer that this is a well-tried 
remedy to help reading-delayed children (W). If your colleague is not satisfi ed with this 
warrant, he may ask you why you think this remedy helps. In Toulminian terms, he is asking 
you to justify your warrant, to give it the authority it needs to license the inference from D 
to C. He is asking for backing of the warrant. And here research evidence comes into the 
picture. You may, for example, refer to a randomized controlled trial indicating that com-
pared with the control group, children who received this intervention for two consecutive 
10-week periods, made signifi cant progress on measure of letter knowledge, single word 
reading and phoneme awareness (B). Th is study concludes that a reading intervention pro-
gram systematically delivered over a period of time is an eff ective intervention for children 
who show reading delays at the end of their fi rst school year.28 It supports your warrant and 
indirectly your decision.
Let me expand on this. First, we may see a goal as being implicitly present, for example 
the goal of teaching all children to read well. Second, when research evidence serves the 
27 Toulmin, 92.
28 Peter Hatcher et.al., «Effi  cacy of small group reading intervention for readers with reading-delay: A randomised 
controlled trial,” Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry 48, no. 8 (2006), 820-827.
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function of backing, it occupies a more indirect role in reasoning toward a decision of what 
to do. It certainly does not function as truths which we can translate directly into rules 
for action. It rather functions in accordance with what I above took to be the common 
philosophical understanding, namely as support for the warrant. But the distinctions may 
be very fi ne here, since “evidence” can be used in both capacities, both as D and B. I have 
treated D rather step-motherly in my example, and no doubt the data comprising D can 
come in many diff erent shapes, from observations in practice to test scores indicating that 
children may have low phoneme awareness. As Jenicek and Hitchcock point out:
Th e grounds [data D] are the underlying evidence that supports this claim, that is, the 
results. Th e argument is evidence-based in the sense that the claim rests on systematically 
obtained observations.29 
Th at is to say, D should be justifi ed. Th is means that evidence, including quantitative 
research evidence, can also in some cases perform the function of D. Nevertheless, it makes 
sense to say that in the practical reasoning that we are talking about here, the data that 
provides the starting point are more likely to be an observation of a problem or a situation 
that requires some form of action on part of the practitioner. Th e important thing to keep 
in mind is that D and B answer diff erent questions, perform diff erent functions.
Th ird, there is the question of qualifi ers and rebuttals or conditions of exception. Th ey 
both speak to the bearing of W on the inference from D to C, that is, to the applicability of 
W. “[…] qualifi ers (Q) indicating the strength conferred by the warrant on this [i.e. the D–C 
step], conditions of rebuttal (R) indicating circumstances in which the general authority of 
the warrant would have to be set aside”.30 Hargreaves,31 it will be recalled, wants research 
evidence that demonstrates conclusively that strategy y yields better results than strategy x. 
Th is, I take it, amounts to his wanting a universal warrant with an absolute backing, allow-
ing no exceptions at all. Later he (albeit apparently unwillingly) softens this view somewhat 
and deals in probabilities instead.32
Hatcher et.al. on the other hand, state explicitly that there are exceptions; 25% of the 
children did not respond to the intervention. Th ey also provide a description of the pre-
dictors that characterize the non-responders and suggest that these account for the non-
responsiveness to the intervention.33 If we use Hatcher’s quantitative data as backing, we 
cannot use take “this is a well-tried remedy” to be a universal warrant, but for the sake of 
this argument we can take it to be a general warrant and accept it as lending authority to 
our decision. Th us, we would have to expand our practical reasoning: based on observa-
29 Jenicek and Hitchcock, Evidence-based practice, 165.
30 Toulmin, Th e Uses of Argument, 94.
31 Hargreaves, “Teaching as a research-based profession.”
32 David Hargreaves, “In defense of research for evidence-based teaching: a rejoinder to Martyn Hammersly,” British 
Educational Research Journal 23, no. 4 (1997), 405-419.
33 Hatcher et.al., “Effi  cacy of small group reading intervention for readers with reading delay,” 825.
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tions of reading delays (D), you infer that unless the children have extremely low scores on 
word recognition and letter knowledge (R), they will presumably (Q) respond well to extra 
word and text training (C), since this is a well-tried remedy for reading-delayed children 
(W); the warrant being backed by sound evidence (B). 
Fourth, it is simply assumed here that the research evidence is sound. But to appeal to 
(empirical) evidence might give an aura of scientifi c support that is misleading, perhaps 
even unfounded, if the quality of the evidence is poor. It is also the case in educational 
research that conclusions tend to be contradicted in other studies; that is, in a good many 
studies there is both positive and negative evidence. In such cases it is an open question 
whether the warrant can be said to carry any authority at all. Decision makers (and others) 
may be very selective in their appeal to evidence to support or justify their views or deci-
sions – proponents of virtually any claim can thus maintain that the “evidence” supports 
their views. It may also be the case that competing decisions C, inferred from the same 
data, are equally well justifi ed with a warrant backed by sound research evidence. Th ere are, 
for example, other forms of intervention to remedy poor, slow or delayed reading; such as 
programs focusing on letter-sound knowledge and phonological awareness, and on vocab-
ulary, inference generation and narrative skills.34 Conditions of exception are reported for 
both programs, to the extent that it would be problematic to say that either of them con-
fers authority on a warrant,35 a general warrant is not applicable. In use of research evidence 
it is vital to map, as best one can, the conditions of exception. 
Evidence replaces professional judgment?
Hopefully the above illustrates the diff erence between using evidence as data (D) and as 
backing (B). Advocates and critics of EBP alike seem to quite naturally cast evidence in the 
role of data, such that practice can be directly derived from this assumed foundation of 
facts and statistics. Employing Toulmin’s model I have argued above that it makes more 
sense to cast evidence in an indirect role as backing of warrant. Th at makes the reasoning 
toward a decision of what to do more longwinded, but it has the additional virtue of forc-
ing the practitioner to pay attention to possible exceptions.
Unlike critics such as Gert Biesta, John Elliott, Martyn Hammersley and Ian Sanderson I 
am not afraid that research evidence will replace professional judgment. To accord evidence 
the function of backing, is rather to show how it can enter into and be part of professional 
judgment. To the best of my knowledge, no EBP adherent has ever argued that research 
evidence should replace professional judgment; Hargreaves himself explicitly states that 
evidence should enhance judgment, not replace it – although he does not say how. 
Th e issue of general versus context-bound knowledge is frequently discussed in educa-
tion, and also in the context of EBP. Writers on EBP largely agree that EBP mainly deals in 
34 Claudine Bowyer-Crane et.al., “Improving early language and literacy skills : Diff erential eff ects of an oral language 
versus a phonology with reading intervention,” Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry 49, no. 4 (2008), 422-432.
35 Bowyer-Crane et.al., 422.
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generalized evidence, but they disagree about the value of generality. Hargreaves thinks it is 
a good thing and therefore welcomes RCT; Elliott thinks it is a bad thing and recommends 
case studies instead.36 Most critics opt for context-bound evidence, because judgments are 
deeply context-dependent. 
General knowledge of course is problematic if one thinks that EBP entails that practi-
tioners are reduced to following general rules of action with no opportunity to adapt the 
knowledge to the concrete circumstances. It is hard to see precisely what the EBP critics 
take a professional judgment to be and what sort of considerations they see as entering 
into such judgments. Th ey are context-dependent, so must clearly make use of contextual 
data, but which data, and how? Some critics also argue that EBP should be rejected because 
the generalized knowledge (evidence) in question exclusively speaks to the eff ectiveness of 
a given strategy, not only ignoring but precluding questions of ethics or appropriateness.37 
What works is not what matters, Sanderson argues, what is appropriate is what matters. 
And here is the other element in professional judgments: they seem to be intimately asso-
ciated with ethical concerns, not instrumental ones. But then again, it is hard to see why 
these should be seen as mutually exclusive. Elliott attributes to Hargreaves the view that 
generalizations can be continually improved upon, thus moving in the direction of univer-
sal statements which in turn entail a progressive diminution of unpredictability in human 
aff airs. Th is is an interesting observation and quite possibly true of Hargreaves’ wishes for 
EBP, but not necessarily true of EBP. 
Does EBP imply a diminution of unpredictability in learning, such that the probability 
of attaining the predetermined goals is maximized, bordering on certainty? Many educa-
tionists are highly suspicious of generalized solutions to educational problems. Th is worry 
points to characteristics of the educational fi eld itself: its (practical) problems are diverse, 
unstable, unpredictable and occur in messy, particular contexts.38 While I by and large 
agree with this description, it does not follow that practitioners cannot avail themselves 
of generalized knowledge or even of RCT evidence. As Jenicek and Hitchcock point out, 
uncertainty in a fi eld does not speak against EBP; what happens is rather that the warrant 
for the D–C inference is merely provisional or presumptive. 
All human aff airs, including education, can be said to include some measure of uncer-
tainty, some degree of randomness. It may be true that the educational climate today 
incorporates a wish for teaching methods to guarantee that the predetermined learning 
outcomes are attained, and EBP is part of this climate. But, thankfully, EBP cannot guaran-
tee learning outcomes, nor should it really be expected too. Hargreaves may want conclu-
sive evidence, but the world of education is simply not like that. But neither is it completely 
chaotic and unpredictable and all educational problems are not unique. 
36 Elliott, “Making evidence-based practice educational,” 564.
37 For example, Sanderson, “Is it ‘what works’ that matters.”
38 Bridges, Smeyers and Smith, “Educational research and the practical judgement of policy makers.”
32 Studier i Pædagogisk Filosofi  | Årgang 2 | Nr. 2 | 2013
Th e critics of EBP are surely right that professional judgment in education, practical 
reasoning, does not consist in the unrefl ective following of rules directly derived from gen-
eral research evidence. Rather it at least partly consists in reasoning to a decision about a 
particular course of action in a concrete situation characterized by uncertainty and many 
unknown (and presumably ungovernable) factors. Th e pathway of reasoning that emerges 
from Toulmin’s model and that is developed by Jenicek and Hitchcock, is one that begins 
from particular concerns, proceeds in various steps from D to C, the step authorized by a 
warrant which should be backed by generalized (or other) evidence, via a check on condi-
tions of exceptions which may render the warrant inapplicable, and back to a decision 
about what to do in the concrete case. Th ere is no reason why practical reasoning should 
leave out ethical concerns – one can know of an eff ective method and refrain from using it 
on ethical grounds. Toulmin’s model is complex and rich enough to accommodate various 
kinds of consideration. Evidently professional judgments are highly complex and there are 
many pitfalls along the way, such as ignoring the importance of making explicit and check-
ing the warrant that licenses the inference from data to claim/decision. I would like again 
to draw attention to the pitfall of ignoring possible conditions of exception; I have a feeling 
this element in educational reasoning is sadly neglected. But one may “misdiagnose” the 
poor readers, their behavior may be misinterpreted, or their “diagnostic” test results may 
for various reasons be misleading (one can note here the temptation to call for more test-
ing of children). If a child is an exception, for example suff ers from severe dyslexia, the pro-
posed remedy might have no eff ect on him. But even if the problems of the children were 
accurately described, one has no guarantee that the preferred course of action will yield 
the desired result. Th ere might in principle be other factors that infl uence the situation and 
that are not within the teacher’s control. Some element of unpredictability remains. 
Conclusion
Th ere are several diff erent elements that are discussed under the EBP heading, and I have 
in this paper focused on one: the possible functions of research evidence in practical rea-
soning – or which is an essential part of teaching. I have chosen to use RCT evidence as my 
example, since this is particularly contested. 
I have argued that both adherents to and critics of EBP seem to hold the same view of 
the function that research evidence is to perform in EBP, namely as a foundation, consist-
ing of facts, data and evidence about what works, from which practice could and should 
be derived. It may be that this understanding is brought on by a literal interpretation of 
the meaning of “based”. For the adherents this is a good thing, since it presumably will 
make education much more eff ective in attaining its goals. While this view may be a bit 
caricatured, it does capture the optimism expressed by advocates of EBP. Th e critics, who 
outnumber the adherents (at least if you do not count politicians and bureaucrats), under-
stand the function of evidence in the same way, but see it as a bad thing. Some interpret 
it as implying that EBP reduces practice to mere unrefl ective rule-following; the evidence 
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decides what you should do. Others problematize the usefulness of general knowledge for 
professional judgments that are inevitably context-bound, and still others see eff ectiveness 
as precluding or at least overriding ethical concerns.
Using Toulmin’s model of the lay-out of an argument, inspired by Jenicek and Hitch-
cock, I have argued that it makes more sense to view research evidence as backing of the 
warrant. Th e direct impact both adherents and critics presuppose entails that evidence be 
understood as data or grounds. Th e critics are right that generalized evidence cannot tell 
you directly what to do with your students. As backing, evidence gets an indirect role in 
complex reasoning toward a decision. It is not enough just to possess evidence of how tings 
are or of how they work; one must also be able to use it. Th ere is plenty of room for sound 
professional judgments in deliberations concerning what to do and how to use available 
general knowledge and evidence. Th is is very far from being unrefl ective rule-following. 
Th ere are good, bad, logical and illogical ways of using evidence; merely having it is not 
suffi  cient.
To use research evidence as backing of the warrant is to accord it an indirect role in pro-
fessional judgment, and may be one way of explaining how research can inform practice. 
Th is might make EBP more acceptable to the critics, since many of them explicitly 
acknowledge that research should inform practice – they just do not tell us what it comes 
down to. Evidence as backing also leaves room for uncertainty, for the unpredictability of 
human aff airs, and Toulmin’s model calls attention to the importance of investigating con-
ditions of exception which might make the warrant weak or inapplicable altogether. 
EBP can thus be said to have received criticism it does not necessarily deserve. It does 
not necessarily entail unrefl ective rule-following. On the other hand, we must not let it get 
away with its part in the broad and highly troublesome instrumentalization of education 
that we see today.
